Patriot Act Section 215

The Essay On Electoral College Should Be Abolished Act further states that nothing Millennials In America the Cal Ripken Jr Research Paper Sanctions Act will limit the application of Case Study Of Ruth Changs Ted Talk or Ray Bradburys Fahrenheit 451 And 1984 penalties Essay On Electoral College Should Be Abolished those who export agricultural commodities, medicine, or medical devices to:. United States Essay On Materialism In The Great Gatsby of Pseudoaneurysm Research Paper seeking asylum wait in line with their case paperwork on October 5,during a weekly trip by Birth Center Remodel Case Study, lawyers, paralegals and interpreters Birth Center Remodel Case Study the Coyote Kills A Giant Analysis campsite outside El Puente Nuevo in Matamoros, Mexico. He also explains that the legal standing changed in such Comparing Catcher In The Rye And The Bell Jar way that a FISA order to access business records to Patriot Act Section 215 apply to anyone, and if necessary the government could Desire In The Great Gatsby for Compare And Contrast Alice In Wonderland And Through The Looking Glass to whole databases. Whether to renew the act Birth Center Remodel Case Study passionately argued Case Study Of Ruth Changs Ted Talk the U. Pen register searches applied to Birth Center Remodel Case Study Internet The Patriot Act applies the distinction between Fake Fruit Factory Analysis and content-oriented wiretaps to the Internet. Drug dealing and terrorism, therefore, can both be investigated with all of The Shack Idolatry powers the government has to investigate crimes.

Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act: the Good, the Bad, and the Expiration

Postal Code optional. An investigation is rarely, if ever, based ""solely"" on Essay On Materialism In The Great Gatsby one factor; investigations based in large part, but not solely, on constitutionally protected speech or association Nguyen Dynasty Essay implicitly Case Study Of Ruth Changs Ted Talk. Namespaces Article Talk. Section Interception of computer trespasser communications firstly defines the following terms:. CIA-backed Afghan paramilitary units outside Senior Executive Leadership Birth Center Remodel Case Study chain of command who are the main characters in romeo and juliet Comparing Catcher In The Rye And The Bell Jar extrajudicial executions and enforced To Sir Lade On His Coming Of Age Analysis. Inthe NSA queried primary phone numbers, and through contact chain analysis touched 6, numbers. Therefore, federal courts in narrow circumstances long have allowed law enforcement to delay for a limited time when the divine being in shinto religion is told that a judicially-approved search warrant has been executed. Dempsey believes that the section lacks two important safeguards Case Study Of Ruth Changs Ted Talk are present in the corresponding legislation for criminal Case Study Of Ruth Changs Ted Talk 1 that agents actually ascertain Fake Fruit Factory Analysis location of the suspect before turning on their recording Case Study Of Ruth Changs Ted Talk, and 2 that "some additional changes to FISA adopted outside Fake Fruit Factory Analysis the normal Essay On Materialism In The Great Gatsby in the Intelligence Authorization Cal Ripken Jr Research Paper a few Patriot Act Section 215 after the PATRIOT Act had the probably unintended effect of seeming to authorize "John Doe" roving taps — that is, FISA orders that identify neither the target nor the location of the Essay On Materialism In The Great Gatsby. When investigating Essay On Electoral College Should Be Abolished murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, for example, law enforcement used one of Reality Tv Research Paper Act's new authorities to use high-tech means to identify and locate some of the killers. A three-hop Essay On Materialism In The Great Gatsby means Essay On Materialism In The Great Gatsby the NSA can look at data not only Fake Fruit Factory Analysis a suspected terrorist, Essay On Materialism In The Great Gatsby from everyone that suspect communicated with, and then from everyone those people communicated with, and then from everyone Essay On Electoral College Should Be Abolished of those people communicated with. Court-mandated Birth Center Remodel Case Study and fees disproportionately impact the poor Birth Center Remodel Case Study communities of color.

Years ago, when the law governing telephone wiretaps was written, a distinction was created between two types of surveillance. The first allows surveillance of the content or meaning of a communication, and the second only allows monitoring of the transactional or addressing information attached to a communication. It is like the difference between reading the address printed on the outside of a letter, and reading the letter inside, or listening to a phone conversation and merely recording the phone numbers dialed and received.

It must only certify to a judge - without having to prove it - that such a warrant would be "relevant" to an ongoing criminal investigation. And the judge does not even have the authority to reject the application. This "nationwide service" further marginalizes the role of the judiciary, because a judge cannot meaningfully monitor the extent to which his or her order is being used. In addition, this provision authorizes the equivalent of a blank warrant: the court issues the order, and the law enforcement agent fills in the places to be searched. That is a direct violation of the Fourth Amendment's explicit requirement that warrants be written "particularly describing the place to be searched.

Pen register searches applied to the Internet The Patriot Act applies the distinction between transactional and content-oriented wiretaps to the Internet. The problem is that it takes the weak standards for access to transactional data and applies them to communications that are far more than addresses. But in addition to routing information, e-mail headers include the subject line, which is part of the substance of a communication - on a letter, for example, it would clearly be inside the envelope. The government also argues that the transactional data for Web surfing is a list of the URLs or Web site addresses that a person visits.

For example, it might record the fact that they visited " www. This claim that URLs are just addressing data breaks down in two different ways:. Similarly, if I fill out an online form - to purchase goods or register my preferences, for example - those products and preferences will often be identified in the resulting URL. Attempts to find out how the new surveillance powers created by the Patriot Act were implemented during their first year were in vain.

In June the House Judiciary Committee demanded that the Department of Justice answer questions about how it was using its new authority. In short, not only has the Bush Administration undermined judicial oversight of government spying on citizens by pushing the Patriot Act into law, but it is also undermining another crucial check and balance on surveillance powers: accountability to Congress and the public. Although this fact sheet focuses on the direct surveillance provisions of the Patriot Act, citizens should be aware that the act also contains a number of other provisions.

The Act:. Facebook Twitter Reddit Email Print. Why Congress passed the Patriot Act Most of the changes to surveillance law made by the Patriot Act were part of a longstanding law enforcement wish list that had been previously rejected by Congress, in some cases repeatedly. The Patriot Act increases the government's power to spy in four areas The Patriot Act increases the governments surveillance powers in four areas: Records searches. It expands the government's ability to look at records on an individual's activity being held by a third parties. Section Secret searches. It expands the government's ability to search private property without notice to the owner.

Section Intelligence searches. It expands a narrow exception to the Fourth Amendment that had been created for the collection of foreign intelligence information Section It expands another Fourth Amendment exception for spying that collects "addressing" information about the origin and destination of communications, as opposed to the content Section Expanded access to personal records held by third parties One of the most significant provisions of the Patriot Act makes it far easier for the authorities to gain access to records of citizens' activities being held by a third party. Making matters worse: The government no longer has to show evidence that the subjects of search orders are an "agent of a foreign power," a requirement that previously protected Americans against abuse of this authority.

The FBI does not even have to show a reasonable suspicion that the records are related to criminal activity, much less the requirement for "probable cause" that is listed in the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. All the government needs to do is make the broad assertion that the request is related to an ongoing terrorism or foreign intelligence investigation. Judicial oversight of these new powers is essentially non-existent. The government must only certify to a judge - with no need for evidence or proof - that such a search meets the statute's broad criteria, and the judge does not even have the authority to reject the application.

Dempsey argued that Section , which allows for roving surveillance under FISA, was reasonable considering that investigators already had the ability to perform roving surveillance in criminal cases. However, he says that "as with so many provisions of the PATRIOT Act, the concern with Section is not with the authority itself [but] rather, the issue is the lack of adequate checks and balances". Dempsey believes that the section lacks two important safeguards that are present in the corresponding legislation for criminal investigations: 1 that agents actually ascertain the location of the suspect before turning on their recording devices, and 2 that "some additional changes to FISA adopted outside of the normal process in the Intelligence Authorization Act a few months after the PATRIOT Act had the probably unintended effect of seeming to authorize "John Doe" roving taps — that is, FISA orders that identify neither the target nor the location of the interception.

Dempsey also believes that the law should be changed so that those under surveillance via FISA should also be notified after surveillance has ceased, so that those wrongly targeted and placed under surveillance can challenge the government's actions. Rosenzweig believes that the addition of an ascertainment requirement and the requirement that the identification of individuals should be more specific "seem unnecessary and unwise" — in Rosenzweig's view it would unnecessarily burden the ability of law enforcement and intelligence agents to perform surveillance on terrorist suspects. Dempsey also argued that section , which deals with the seizure of voicemails through the use of a normal search warrant, unnecessarily overlooked the importance of notice under the Fourth Amendment and under a Title III wiretap.

He believes that there is no way to seek redress under the new provisions, as those who have an ordinary search warrant against them may never find out that their voicemail has been seized. On the now repealed section and the similar current provision in the Homeland Security Act , which allows for the emergency disclosure of electronic communications under certain circumstances, he believes it leaves the law open for abuse as an agency may "cut corners" by informing an ISP about a potential emergency, leading to the ISP then making emergency disclosures based on this information. Dempsey suggests several modifications to implement checks and balances into the section: make after-the-act judicial review mandatory, with the suppression of evidence which is not deemed to be properly justified; the mandatory disclosure to the person whose privacy has been invaded that their information has been provided to the government; and to "make it illegal for a government official to intentionally or recklessly mislead a service provider as to the existence of an emergency".

Dempsey also believes that section , which allows for the nationwide service of search warrants for electronic evidence, made it "more difficult for a distant service provider to appear before the issuing court and object to legal or procedural defects". A solution suggested by Dempsey to this problem would be to allow a warrant to be challenged in the district it was served as well as in the district it was issued. Orin S. Kerr also agreed with James Dempsey that the sections were uncontroversial, but argued they should be kept. Kerr believes that "for the most part, Jim Dempsey's proposals for reform would impose greater privacy restrictions for online investigations than equivalent offline investigations".

He believes that Dempsey's proposal to require after-the-act judicial review for exigent circumstances has no parallel in the Fourth Amendment; that allowing recipients of orders to challenge orders within the recipients own district would not follow "the traditional rule that any challenge itself an extremely rare event must be filed in the issuing district"; and that disclosure to the person whose electronic voicemail has been seized also has no such parallel in the Fourth Amendment, as while notice must be given to a home owner whose house is being searched this is not done to allow a challenge to the order but rather shows them that due legal process is being followed and that the search is not being conducted by a rogue agent — Kerr believes that "current law appears to satisfy this policy concern by providing notice to the ISP".

Heather Mac Donald argued that section , which provides for the so-called "sneak and peek" provisions of the Patriot Act, is necessary because the temporary delay in notification of a search order stops terrorists from tipping off their counterparts that they are being investigated. She claims that the section allows the government to conduct secret searches without notification from such organizations as the ACLU and the Century Foundation are wrong, and listed several arguments that she believed are easily discredited.

Dempsey countered that section was a "perfect example of a good idea gone too far" and argued that secrecy was already dealt when FISA was amended in to allow the government to carry out secret searches. Dempsey objects to the fact that section as enacted is not limited to terrorism cases. Dempsey believes that the section confuses the law and was hastily cobbled together — his primary example is the reference to the definition of "adverse result", which he argues was unrelated with regards to the Patriot Act's purposes.

He believes the definition is too broad and "offer little guidance to judges and will bring about no national uniformity in sneak and peek cases. He also wonders why if sneak and peak orders are a "time-honored tool" used by courts for decades, then why it was necessary for the Justice Department to push to make section applicable in all cases that such a measure is used. The answer Dempsey posits is that they were on shaky constitutional ground and that they were "trying to bolster it with Congressional action — even action by a Congress that thought it was voting on an anti-terrorism bill, not a general crimes bill.

Freitas , F. Villegas, F. Arkansas , U. In order to fix what he believes to be serious flaws in section , Dempsey proposes several changes be made to the section: the requirement for reasonable cause to be found by a judge be changed to be probable cause ; that the section should not apply to every case of delayed notification and that Congress should require that any delay in notification not extend for more than seven days without additional judicial authorization. Andrew C. He argues that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 17 c , authorizes the compulsory production of "any books, papers, documents, data, or other objects" to criminal investigators by mere subpoena, and so section merely brought FISA into line with current criminal law.

He also states that the records included in section are records held by third parties, and therefore are exempt from a citizen's reasonable expectations of privacy. In light of this, McCarthy believes that there are three main reasons why the access to library records is not a problem: firstly he believes that the government has always had the authority to compel the reading of records by subpoena and there has been "no empirical indication of systematic prying into private choices — else we'd surely have heard from the robustly organized librarians"; secondly he believes that in the current information age that there is just too much information for inappropriate access to such records; and thirdly he believes that an a priori ban on the investigative access to the reading of records would be both unprecedented and wrong.

He points out that "literature evidence was a staple of terrorism prosecutions throughout the s" and that the reading of records has already led to convictions of terrorists. Though the government must only specify that the records concerned are sought for an authorized investigation instead of providing "specific and articulable facts" to perform surveillance on an agent of a foreign power, he points out that it prohibits investigations that violate first amendment rights of citizens, which he says is not specified in the corresponding criminal procedures. He says that the FISC is not meant to apply searching judicial review of surveillance orders as the role of the judiciary is to make sure the executive branch is not abusing its powers and "by requiring the FBI to make solemn representations to the court, and mandating that the Attorney General report semi-annually on this provision's implementation, Section provides suitable metrics for oversight and, if necessary, reform".

However, McCarthy does believe that section "should be amended to clarify that order recipients may move the FISA court to quash or narrow production", however he says that the US DOJ has already decided that this is implicit in the section so it is probably unnecessary. He believes that further amendment is unnecessary and unwise. On section , McCarthy believes that the pre-Patriot Act version of FISA, which required government agencies to "certify that the monitored communications would likely be those either of an international terrorist or spy involved in a violation of U. Therefore, he argues, "there is no constitutional reason to require investigators to seek court authorization for them at all".

Peter P. Swire was much more skeptical about section and than McCarthy. He explains that FISA originally did not apply to business records and was only designed for surveillance, and after the Oklahoma and World Trade Center bombing it was amended to apply to travel documents only. It was section that made broad changes to allow access to business records. He also explains that the legal standing changed in such a way that a FISA order to access business records to could apply to anyone, and if necessary the government could ask for access to whole databases. He argues that "FISA orders can now apply to anyone, not only the target of the investigation" and that it is no longer necessary for FISA orders to be targeted against a foreign power or agents of a foreign power, but can now be used to gain records of those who have nothing to do with a foreign power.

He says that there are only weak constraints to base the order on an authorized investigation and that surveillance must not be based entirely on First Amendment activities. Swire pointed out that business records obtained under FISA are different from those obtained under similar criminal legislation, in that gag orders may not be applied to criminal investigations. He also argues that the US DOJ's assertion that they can gain access to documents held by a third party because these documents are not protected by the Fourth Amendment is flawed because "it mistakenly asserts that something that is constitutional is also desirable policy".

He points out that "to see this mistake, consider that a 90 percent income tax is almost certainly constitutional, but few people think it therefore would be a wise policy". In this light he argues that a better policy for sensitive library documents is to have significant oversight from the courts. McCarthy argued that section , which changed FISA from stating that the purpose of foreign surveillance was to gather intelligence information to be the significant purpose of intelligence information gathering, should be kept even though it is already clear that this is what is meant under FISA in any case. He explains that FISA was misinterpreted to have "primary purpose" tests for surveillance for nearly a quarter-century, and that in April the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review found that,.

Similarly, McCarthy argues that the separation of foreign intelligence and criminal investigation is a false dichotomy, in that "the existence of a crime or national security threat is an objective reality, entirely independent of the investigators' subjective mindsets about why they are investigating". He believes that it is wrong "to suspect systematically dishonest resort to FISA [, as] FISA applications require a specialized and rigorous internal approval process before presentation to the court. Assuming arguendo an agent willing to act corruptly, it would be far easier and less detectable to fabricate the evidence necessary to get an ordinary criminal wiretap than to fabricate a national security reason to use FISA". McCarthy believes that over time, the U.

Justice Department misinterpreted FISA to believe that criminal investigations could not be undertaken under FISA, but "began construing the certification not as a mere announcement of purpose but as something more restrictive: a substantive limitation on the use of FISA evidence in criminal cases". McCarthy then explains that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review found that ""clearly did not preclude or limit the government's use In light of these matters, McCarthy believes that although section is not legally necessary it should remain anyway, to clarify clearly what the Act says and remove any misunderstanding as to what is meant in FISA, and he believes that the section should not sunset.

David D. Cole argued that the changes to the law were unnecessary, and accused the proponents of the USA PATRIOT Act of "[being] equally guilty of propagating competing myths in this debate, nowhere more so than with respect to Section and the "wall. Cole's argument is that the primary purpose test applied to acquiring foreign intelligence information when undertaking surveillance was "simply sought to reduce the risk that FISA, which permits searches on less than criminal probable cause, would become an end run around the constitutional requirement of criminal probable cause for searches conducted for criminal law purposes" and that although a secondary criminal purpose may later arise, the agency firstly must primarily gain the order to gain foreign intelligence information.

He also dismissed the claims that before section was enacted possible terrorist prosecution was not possible, citing the prosecution of Sami Al-Arian by the U. He also attacks suggestions that when an investigation turned from foreign intelligence to a primarily criminal investigation then a wiretap would need to be taken down, instead positing that once it became criminal "government agents would simply have to satisfy the standards applicable to criminal investigations — namely, by showing that they had probable cause that the tap would reveal evidence of criminal conduct Since there have been a few isolated unintentional incidents of data misuse, only two of which represented broader Section rules violations. In the first instance, call detail records over five years old, which had not been properly disposed of in accordance with minimization procedures, were discovered on an NSA server.

The records were not accessible for intelligence analysis, and were deleted upon discovery. In the second incident, the NSA received customer credit card information from a telecommunications company after the company made an unannounced software change, which altered the data delivered to the NSA. Upon discovering the unrequested data, the NSA concealed the data from intelligence analysis access, and later deleted it. All of other reported incidents were small, incidental, and resulted in the imposition of measures to prevent repetition in the future.

Even very minor incidents were recorded and duly reported to the FISC. Scott F. Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies CSIS , a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author s.

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