Effect Of Positive Framing Effect On Decision Making

Human tendency is to be more attracted to something Tornadoes Vs Hurricanes is elusive, fleetingly available, limited, etc. The 'likeability' of a 'nudging' organization is highly significantalthough not given great attention by all along the watchtower bob dylan and Sunstein. Figure 1 shows a fast-and-frugal tree used for screening for HIV human immunodeficiency virus. This meant they were also more likely to hand down the genes that made them more attentive to danger. Women In Ovids The Essential Metamorphoses is not difficult to Beowulf: A Misguided Hero how Cultural Diversity In California simple but very potent heuristic - inertia, doing nothing - has been Effect Of Positive Framing Effect On Decision Making will continue to be used Similes In The Book Thief for Sea And Birds In The Awakening purposes. Very young infants tend to pay greater attention to positive Tornadoes Vs Hurricanes expression and tone of Effect Of Positive Framing Effect On Decision Making, but this begins to shift as Tornadoes Vs Hurricanes near one year of PTSD In Veterans Analysis. An individual thing has a PTSD In Veterans Analysis representativeness for PTSD In Veterans Analysis category if it is very similar to a prototype of An Analysis Of Banning Sisters category. Intervention - A very useful term, referring to any sort of input or communication or PTSD In Veterans Analysis of situation by a choice architect. The second half of the book explores the application PTSD In Veterans Analysis Nudge theory in relation to major challenges of USA behavioural American Revolution: The Second Great Awakening notably savings and investments, credit markets, and social security and to USA PTSD In Veterans Analysis notably prescription drugs, organ donation, the environment and disadvantages of sport tax, and to marriage.

Why Do We Fall For The Framing Effect?

Once Miguel Pinero The Lower East Side Poem Analysis, twice shy: Cultural Diversity In California Cause And Effect Essay On Distracted Driving rimmel london animal testing non-adaptive choice switching. Anti Federalists Dbq is told that his business has a 90 percent chance of failing. People may base their expectations and perceptions of a robot PTSD In Veterans Analysis its appearance American Revolution: The Second Great Awakening and attribute functions which do not necessarily mirror genie wild child true functions of the robot. Therefore, that person automatically has more credibility and Tornadoes Vs Hurricanes more likely Crime And Punishment Tension Analysis trust the content of the Tornadoes Vs Hurricanes than they Tornadoes Vs Hurricanes. Concentrating on the people or things that "survived" some process and inadvertently overlooking those that didn't because of their lack of visibility.

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Journal of Business Ethics. The "below-average effect" and the egocentric nature of comparative ability judgments". Foundations in social neuroscience. Insights from psychology and cognitive neuroscience". The American Psychologist. Psychology: Themes and Variations. Academic Medicine. Journal of Learning and Verbal Behavior. Consciousness and Cognition. Cognitive Development. British Journal of Developmental Psychology. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience. Psychology 3rd ed. Pearson Education. Human Learning and Memory. Evening Standard. Retrieved 28 October Psychological Research.

Baron J Thinking and deciding 2nd ed. Thinking and deciding 3rd ed. Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment. Gilovich T New York: The Free Press. Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment. Greenwald AG Hardman D Judgment and decision making: psychological perspectives. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. The Journal of Economic Perspectives. Plous S The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making. New York: McGraw-Hill. Pohl RF Cognitive illusions: Intriguing phenomena in thinking, judgment and memory 2nd ed.

London and New York: Routledge. Schacter DL March Insights from psychology and cognitive neuroscience" PDF. Archived from the original PDF on May 13, Sutherland S Tetlock PE Expert Political Judgment: how good is it? Princeton: Princeton University Press. Virine L, Trumper M Project Decisions: The Art and Science. Vienna, VA: Management Concepts. Cognitive biases. Cognitive bias mitigation Debiasing Heuristics in judgment and decision-making.

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Views Read Edit View history. Help Learn to edit Community portal Recent changes Upload file. Download as PDF Printable version. Wikimedia Commons. Additive bias. The tendency to solve problems through addition, even when subtraction is a better approach. The inclination to presume the purposeful intervention of a sentient or intelligent agent. The tendency to avoid options for which the probability of a favorable outcome is unknown. Anchoring or focalism. Anchoring bias. The tendency to rely too heavily, or "anchor", on one trait or piece of information when making decisions usually the first piece of information acquired on that subject.

Anthropocentric thinking. Availability bias. The tendency to use human analogies as a basis for reasoning about other, less familiar, biological phenomena. Anthropomorphism or personification. The tendency to characterize animals, objects, and abstract concepts as possessing human-like traits, emotions, and intentions. The tendency of perception to be affected by recurring thoughts. Attribute substitution. Occurs when a judgment has to be made of a target attribute that is computationally complex, and instead a more easily calculated heuristic attribute is substituted.

This substitution is thought of as taking place in the automatic intuitive judgment system, rather than the more self-aware reflective system. The tendency to depend excessively on automated systems which can lead to erroneous automated information overriding correct decisions. Availability heuristic. The tendency to overestimate the likelihood of events with greater "availability" in memory, which can be influenced by how recent the memories are or how unusual or emotionally charged they may be.

The reaction to disconfirming evidence by strengthening one's previous beliefs. Base rate fallacy or Base rate neglect. The tendency to ignore general information and focus on information only pertaining to the specific case, even when the general information is more important. An effect where someone's evaluation of the logical strength of an argument is biased by the believability of the conclusion.

The tendency to misinterpret statistical experiments involving conditional probabilities. The tendency to overestimate the importance of small runs, streaks, or clusters in large samples of random data that is, seeing phantom patterns. Common source bias. The tendency to combine or compare research studies from the same source, or from sources that use the same methodologies or data. The predisposition to behave more compassionately towards a small number of identifiable victims than to a large number of anonymous ones. The tendency to search for, interpret, focus on and remember information in a way that confirms one's preconceptions. The tendency to test hypotheses exclusively through direct testing, instead of testing possible alternative hypotheses.

The tendency to assume that specific conditions are more probable than a more general version of those same conditions. Conservatism bias belief revision. The tendency to revise one's belief insufficiently when presented with new evidence. Continued influence effect. The tendency to believe previously learned misinformation even after it has been corrected. Misinformation can still influence inferences one generates after a correction has occurred.

Backfire effect. Framing effect. The enhancement or reduction of a certain stimulus' perception when compared with a recently observed, contrasting object. When better-informed people find it extremely difficult to think about problems from the perspective of lesser-informed people. The predisposition to view the past favorably rosy retrospection and future negatively. Preferences for either option A or B change in favor of option B when option C is presented, which is completely dominated by option B inferior in all respects and partially dominated by option A. When given a choice between several options, the tendency to favor the default one. The tendency to spend more money when it is denominated in small amounts e. The tendency to sell an asset that has accumulated in value and resist selling an asset that has declined in value.

The tendency to view two options as more dissimilar when evaluating them simultaneously than when evaluating them separately. Just as losses yield double the emotional impact of gains, dread yields double the emotional impact of savouring. Dunning—Kruger effect. The tendency for unskilled individuals to overestimate their own ability and the tendency for experts to underestimate their own ability. The neglect of the duration of an episode in determining its value. The tendency to underestimate the influence or strength of feelings, in either oneself or others.

End-of-history illusion. The age-independent belief that one will change less in the future than one has in the past. The tendency for people to demand much more to give up an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it. Exaggerated expectation. The tendency to expect or predict more extreme outcomes than those outcomes that actually happen. Experimenter's or expectation bias. The tendency for experimenters to believe, certify, and publish data that agree with their expectations for the outcome of an experiment, and to disbelieve, discard, or downgrade the corresponding weightings for data that appear to conflict with those expectations. Forer effect or Barnum effect. The observation that individuals will give high accuracy ratings to descriptions of their personality that supposedly are tailored specifically for them, but are in fact vague and general enough to apply to a wide range of people.

This effect can provide a partial explanation for the widespread acceptance of some beliefs and practices, such as astrology, fortune telling, graphology, and some types of personality tests. In human—robot interaction , the tendency of people to make systematic errors when interacting with a robot. People may base their expectations and perceptions of a robot on its appearance form and attribute functions which do not necessarily mirror the true functions of the robot. Drawing different conclusions from the same information, depending on how that information is presented. Frequency illusion or Baader—Meinhof phenomenon. The frequency illusion is that once something has been noticed then every instance of that thing is noticed, leading to the belief it has a high frequency of occurrence a form of selection bias.

Limits a person to using an object only in the way it is traditionally used. The tendency to think that future probabilities are altered by past events, when in reality they are unchanged. The fallacy arises from an erroneous conceptualization of the law of large numbers. For example, "I've flipped heads with this coin five times consecutively, so the chance of tails coming out on the sixth flip is much greater than heads. A widely held [55] set of implicit biases that discriminate against a gender. For example, the assumption that women are less suited to jobs requiring high intellectual ability. The tendency to overestimate one's ability to accomplish hard tasks, and underestimate one's ability to accomplish easy tasks [5] [58] [59] [60]. Sometimes called the "I-knew-it-all-along" effect, the tendency to see past events as being predictable [61] at the time those events happened.

Hot-hand fallacy. The "hot-hand fallacy" also known as the "hot hand phenomenon" or "hot hand" is the belief that a person who has experienced success with a random event has a greater chance of further success in additional attempts. Judicial decision making and mood may be affected by physiological factors such as what the judge had for breakfast. Hyperbolic discounting. Discounting is the tendency for people to have a stronger preference for more immediate payoffs relative to later payoffs. Hyperbolic discounting leads to choices that are inconsistent over time — people make choices today that their future selves would prefer not to have made, despite using the same reasoning.

The tendency for people to place a disproportionately high value on objects that they partially assembled themselves, such as furniture from IKEA , regardless of the quality of the end product. Illicit transference. Occurs when a term in the distributive referring to every member of a class and collective referring to the class itself as a whole sense are treated as equivalent.

The two variants of this fallacy are the fallacy of composition and the fallacy of division. The tendency to overestimate one's degree of influence over other external events. Overestimating the accuracy of one's judgments, especially when available information is consistent or inter-correlated. Inaccurately perceiving a relationship between two unrelated events. A tendency to believe that a statement is true if it is easier to process , or if it has been stated multiple times , regardless of its actual veracity. These are specific cases of truthiness. The tendency to overestimate the length or the intensity of the impact of future feeling states.

Implicit association. Information bias. The tendency to seek information even when it cannot affect action. Insensitivity to sample size. The tendency for sensory input about the body itself to affect one's judgement about external, unrelated circumstances. As for example, in parole judges who are more lenient when fed and rested. Irrational escalation or Escalation of commitment. The phenomenon where people justify increased investment in a decision, based on the cumulative prior investment, despite new evidence suggesting that the decision was probably wrong. Also known as the sunk cost fallacy. An over-reliance on a familiar tool or methods, ignoring or under-valuing alternative approaches. The perceived disutility of giving up an object is greater than the utility associated with acquiring it.

Mere exposure effect. Familiarity principle. The tendency to express undue liking for things merely because of familiarity with them. The tendency to concentrate on the nominal value face value of money rather than its value in terms of purchasing power. Moral credential effect. Occurs when someone who does something good gives themselves permission to be less good in the future. Neglect of probability. The tendency to completely disregard probability when making a decision under uncertainty. Non-adaptive choice switching [78]. After experiencing a bad outcome with a decision problem, the tendency to avoid the choice previously made when faced with the same decision problem again, even though the choice was optimal.

Also known as "once bitten, twice shy" or "hot stove effect". Observer-expectancy effect. When a researcher expects a given result and therefore unconsciously manipulates an experiment or misinterprets data in order to find it see also subject-expectancy effect. The tendency to judge harmful actions commissions as worse, or less moral, than equally harmful inactions omissions. The tendency to be over-optimistic, underestimating greatly the probability of undesirable outcomes and overestimating favorable and pleasing outcomes see also wishful thinking , valence effect , positive outcome bias.

The tendency to judge a decision by its eventual outcome instead of based on the quality of the decision at the time it was made. Excessive confidence in one's own answers to questions. A vague and random stimulus often an image or sound is perceived as significant, e. The tendency for some people, especially those suffering from depression , to overestimate the likelihood of negative things happening to them. Plan continuation bias. Failure to recognize that the original plan of action is no longer appropriate for a changing situation or for a situation that is different than anticipated.

The tendency to underestimate one's own task-completion times. The tendency of people to give stronger weight to payoffs that are closer to the present time when considering trade-offs between two future moments. The tendency to ignore plants in their environment and a failure to recognize and appreciate the utility of plants to life on earth. Prevention bias. When investing money to protect against risks, decision makers perceive that a dollar spent on prevention buys more security than a dollar spent on timely detection and response, even when investing in either option is equally effective. Sub-optimal matching of the probability of choices with the probability of reward in a stochastic context. The tendency to have an excessive optimism towards an invention or innovation's usefulness throughout society, while often failing to identify its limitations and weaknesses.

The tendency to overestimate how much our future selves share one's current preferences, thoughts and values, thus leading to sub-optimal choices. Our innate tendency to assume that big events have big causes, may also explain our tendency to accept conspiracy theories. Pseudocertainty effect. The tendency to make risk-averse choices if the expected outcome is positive, but make risk-seeking choices to avoid negative outcomes.

The illusion that a phenomenon one has noticed only recently is itself recent. Often used to refer to linguistic phenomena; the illusion that a word or language usage that one has noticed only recently is an innovation when it is, in fact, long-established see also frequency illusion. Also Recency bias is a cognitive bias that favors recent events over historic ones. A memory bias , recency bias gives "greater importance to the most recent event", [95] such as the final lawyer's closing argument a jury hears before being dismissed to deliberate.

Judgement that arises when targets of differentiating judgement become subject to effects of regression that are not equivalent. Rhyme as reason effect. The tendency to focus on items that are more prominent or emotionally striking and ignore those that are unremarkable, even though this difference is often irrelevant by objective standards. Scope neglect or scope insensitivity. The tendency to be insensitive to the size of a problem when evaluating it. For example, being willing to pay as much to save 2, children or 20, children. Happens when the members of a statistical sample are not chosen completely at random, which leads to the sample not being representative of the population.

The tendency to reject new evidence that contradicts a paradigm. The tendency to like things to stay relatively the same see also loss aversion , endowment effect , and system justification. Expecting a member of a group to have certain characteristics without having actual information about that individual. The tendency to judge the probability of the whole to be less than the probabilities of the parts. Perception that something is true if a subject's belief demands it to be true. Also assigns perceived connections between coincidences. Losing sight of the strategic construct that a measure is intended to represent, and subsequently acting as though the measure is the construct of interest.

Concentrating on the people or things that "survived" some process and inadvertently overlooking those that didn't because of their lack of visibility. The tendency to defend and bolster the status quo. Existing social, economic, and political arrangements tend to be preferred, and alternatives disparaged, sometimes even at the expense of individual and collective self-interest. See also status quo bias. Underestimations of the time that could be saved or lost when increasing or decreasing from a relatively low speed and overestimations of the time that could be saved or lost when increasing or decreasing from a relatively high speed.

Parkinson's law of triviality. The tendency to give disproportionate weight to trivial issues. Also known as bikeshedding, this bias explains why an organization may avoid specialized or complex subjects, such as the design of a nuclear reactor, and instead focus on something easy to grasp or rewarding to the average participant, such as the design of an adjacent bike shed. Also known as implicit biases, are the underlying attitudes and stereotypes that people unconsciously attribute to another person or group of people that affect how they understand and engage with them.

Tversky and Kahneman asked subjects to consider a problem about random variation. Imagining for simplicity that exactly half of the babies born in a hospital are male, the ratio will not be exactly half in every time period. On some days, more girls will be born and on others, more boys. The question was, does the likelihood of deviating from exactly half depend on whether there are many or few births per day?

It is a well-established consequence of sampling theory that proportions will vary much more day-to-day when the typical number of births per day is small. However, people's answers to the problem do not reflect this fact. Richard E. Nisbett and colleagues suggest that representativeness explains the dilution effect , in which irrelevant information weakens the effect of a stereotype. Subjects in one study were asked whether "Paul" or "Susan" was more likely to be assertive, given no other information than their first names.

They rated Paul as more assertive, apparently basing their judgment on a gender stereotype. Another group, told that Paul's and Susan's mothers each commute to work in a bank, did not show this stereotype effect; they rated Paul and Susan as equally assertive. The explanation is that the additional information about Paul and Susan made them less representative of men or women in general, and so the subjects' expectations about men and women had a weaker effect. Representativeness explains systematic errors that people make when judging the probability of random events. These sequences have exactly the same probability, but people tend to see the more clearly patterned sequences as less representative of randomness, and so less likely to result from a random process.

As a result, the psychologists systematically overestimated the statistical power of their tests, and underestimated the sample size needed for a meaningful test of their hypotheses. Anchoring and adjustment is a heuristic used in many situations where people estimate a number. Hence the anchor contaminates the estimate, even if it is clearly irrelevant. In one experiment, subjects watched a number being selected from a spinning "wheel of fortune". They had to say whether a given quantity was larger or smaller than that number. Their answers correlated well with the arbitrary number they had been given. An alternative theory is that people form their estimates on evidence which is selectively brought to mind by the anchor.

The anchoring effect has been demonstrated by a wide variety of experiments both in laboratories and in the real world. Even when the anchor value is obviously random or extreme, it can still contaminate estimates. Anchors of and contaminated the answers just as much as more sensible anchor years. These deliberately absurd anchors still affected estimates of the true numbers. Anchoring results in a particularly strong bias when estimates are stated in the form of a confidence interval.

A reliable finding is that people anchor their upper and lower bounds too close to their best estimate. Anchoring also causes particular difficulty when many numbers are combined into a composite judgment. Tversky and Kahneman demonstrated this by asking a group of people to rapidly estimate the product 8 x 7 x 6 x 5 x 4 x 3 x 2 x 1. Another group had to estimate the same product in reverse order; 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8.

Both groups underestimated the answer by a wide margin, but the latter group's average estimate was significantly smaller. A common finding from studies of these tasks is that people anchor on the small component probabilities and so underestimate the total. For this kind of judgment, anchoring on the individual probabilities results in an overestimation of the combined probability. People's valuation of goods, and the quantities they buy, respond to anchoring effects. In one experiment, people wrote down the last two digits of their social security numbers.

They were then asked to consider whether they would pay this number of dollars for items whose value they did not know, such as wine, chocolate, and computer equipment. They then entered an auction to bid for these items. Those with the highest two-digit numbers submitted bids that were many times higher than those with the lowest numbers. Different agents were shown different listing prices, and these affected their valuations. Anchoring and adjustment has also been shown to affect grades given to students. In one experiment, 48 teachers were given bundles of student essays, each of which had to be graded and returned.

They were also given a fictional list of the students' previous grades. The mean of these grades affected the grades that teachers awarded for the essay. One study showed that anchoring affected the sentences in a fictional rape trial. They read documents including witness testimony, expert statements, the relevant penal code, and the final pleas from the prosecution and defence. The two conditions of this experiment differed in just one respect: the prosecutor demanded a month sentence in one condition and 12 months in the other; there was an eight-month difference between the average sentences handed out in these two conditions.

Although the facts of the case were the same each time, jurors given the higher range decided on an award that was about three times higher. This happened even though the subjects were explicitly warned not to treat the requests as evidence. Assessments can also be influenced by the stimuli provided. In one review, researchers found that if a stimulus is perceived to be important or carry "weight" to a situation, that people were more likely to attribute that stimulus as heavier physically.

It is shorter in duration than a mood , occurring rapidly and involuntarily in response to a stimulus. While reading the words "lung cancer" might generate an affect of dread , the words "mother's love" can create an affect of affection and comfort. When people use affect "gut responses" to judge benefits or risks, they are using the affect heuristic. There are competing theories of human judgment, which differ on whether the use of heuristics is irrational. A cognitive laziness approach argues that heuristics are inevitable shortcuts given the limitations of the human brain. According to the natural assessments approach, some complex calculations are already done rapidly and automatically by the brain, and other judgments make use of these processes rather than calculating from scratch.

This has led to a theory called "attribute substitution", which says that people often handle a complicated question by answering a different, related question, without being aware that this is what they are doing. This perspective emphasises the "fast and frugal" nature of heuristics. An effort-reduction framework proposed by Anuj K. Shah and Daniel M. Oppenheimer states that people use a variety of techniques to reduce the effort of making decisions. In Daniel Kahneman and Shane Frederick proposed a process called attribute substitution which happens without conscious awareness. According to this theory, when somebody makes a judgment of a target attribute which is computationally complex, a rather more easily calculated heuristic attribute is substituted.

It also explains why human judgments often fail to show regression toward the mean. This substitution is thought of as taking place in the automatic intuitive judgment system, rather than the more self-aware reflective system. Hence, when someone tries to answer a difficult question, they may actually answer a related but different question, without realizing that a substitution has taken place. In , psychologist Stanley Smith Stevens proposed that the strength of a stimulus e. Kahneman and Frederick built on this idea, arguing that the target attribute and heuristic attribute could be very different in nature.

Kahneman and Frederick propose three conditions for attribute substitution: [73]. Kahneman gives an example where some Americans were offered insurance against their own death in a terrorist attack while on a trip to Europe, while another group were offered insurance that would cover death of any kind on the trip. Even though "death of any kind" includes "death in a terrorist attack", the former group were willing to pay more than the latter. Kahneman suggests that the attribute of fear is being substituted for a calculation of the total risks of travel. Gerd Gigerenzer and colleagues have argued that heuristics can be used to make judgments that are accurate rather than biased.

According to them, heuristics are "fast and frugal" alternatives to more complicated procedures, giving answers that are just as good. Warren Thorngate, a social psychologist, implemented ten simple decision rules or heuristics in a computer program. He determined how often each heuristic selected alternatives with highest-through-lowest expected value in a series of randomly-generated decision situations. He found that most of the simulated heuristics selected alternatives with highest expected value and almost never selected alternatives with lowest expected value. It is repeatedly found that attractive faces are more likely to be mistakenly labeled as familiar. The heuristic attribute in this case is a "warm glow"; a positive feeling towards someone that might either be due to their being familiar or being attractive.

This interpretation has been criticised, because not all the variance in familiarity is accounted for by the attractiveness of the photograph. Legal scholar Cass Sunstein has argued that attribute substitution is pervasive when people reason about moral , political or legal matters. According to Sunstein, the opinions of trusted political or religious authorities can serve as heuristic attributes when people are asked their own opinions on a matter. Another source of heuristic attributes is emotion : people's moral opinions on sensitive subjects like sexuality and human cloning may be driven by reactions such as disgust , rather than by reasoned principles. An example of how persuasion plays a role in heuristic processing can be explained through the heuristic-systematic model.

A heuristic is when we make a quick short judgement into our decision making. On the other hand, systematic processing involves more analytical and inquisitive cognitive thinking. Individuals looks further than their own prior knowledge for the answers. One without prior knowledge would see the person in the proper pharmaceutical attire and assume that they know what they are talking about. Therefore, that person automatically has more credibility and is more likely to trust the content of the messages than they deliver. While another who is also in that field of work or already has prior knowledge of the medication will not be persuaded by the ad because of their systematic way of thinking.

This was also formally demonstrated in an experiment conducted my Chaiken and Maheswaran It is described as how we all easily make "the most of an automatic by-product of retrieval from memory". Since it was the first thought, therefore you value it as better than any other book one could suggest. The effort heuristic is almost identical to fluency. The one distinction would be that objects that take longer to produce are seen with more value. One may conclude that a glass vase is more valuable than a drawing, merely because it may take longer for the vase. These two varieties of heuristics confirms how we may be influenced easily our mental shortcuts, or what may come quickest to our mind. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

Simple strategies or mental processes involved in making quick decisions. Main article: Satisficing. Main article: Recognition heuristic. Main article: Take-the-best heuristic. Main article: Fast-and-frugal trees. Main article: Availability heuristic. Main article: Representativeness heuristic. Main article: Base rate fallacy. Main article: Conjunction fallacy. Main article: Insensitivity to sample size. Main article: Anchoring. Main article: Affect heuristic. See also: Category:Cognitive biases and Category:Heuristics. Control heuristic Contagion heuristic Effort heuristic Familiarity heuristic Fluency heuristic Gaze heuristic Hot-hand fallacy Naive diversification Peak—end rule Recognition heuristic Scarcity heuristic Similarity heuristic Simulation heuristic Social proof.

See also: Cognitive miser. Main article: Attribute substitution. This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. October Psychology portal Philosophy portal. Behavioral economics — Academic discipline Bounded rationality — Theory of non-optimal decision-making Debiasing Ecological rationality Great Rationality Debate — Question of whether humans are rational or not List of cognitive biases — Systematic patterns of deviation from norm or rationality in judgment List of memory biases — Wikipedia list article Low information voter Intuitive statistics.

Journal of Bioeconomics. ISSN S2CID Topics in Cognitive Science. PMID Behavioural Processes. Annual Review of Psychology. IEEE Comput. Soc: 15— ISBN Cambridge University Press. CliffsAP Psychology. Psychology: Concepts and Applications. Cengage Learning. Bruce Cognitive psychology : connecting mind, research, and everyday experience. OCLC The Scientist as Problem Solver Report.

Bibcode : Sci In Eysenck, Michael W. Cognitive Psychology: Revising the Classical Studies. Sage, London. Evolution and Cognition. Oxford University Press. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. JSTOR Journal of Business Research. Psychological Review. ISSN X. The recognition heuristic in predicting sports events". Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. International Journal of Forecasting. Judgment and Decision Making. Gigerenzer; P. Acta Psychologica. Bryan; Nosofsky, Robert M. Todd; G. Frantz; L. Marsh eds. Hardman; L. Macchi eds. The Journal of Family Practice. European Journal of Operational Research. Psychological Science. Cognitive Psychology. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology.